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ABSTRACT 
Side channel attacks (SCAs) have been considered as great threats to modern 
cryptosystems, including RSA and elliptic curve public key cryptosystems. This is 
because the main computations involved in these systems, as the Modular Exponentiation 
(ME) in RSA and scalar multiplication (SM) in elliptic curve system, are potentially 
vulnerable to SCAs. Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) has been shown to be a good 
choice for ME and SM with counter-measures against certain side-channel attacks. 
However, recent research shows that MPL is still vulnerable to some advanced attacks 
[21, 30 and 34]. In this thesis, an improved sequence masking technique is proposed to 
enhance the MPL’s resistance towards Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Based on the 
new technique, a modified MPL with countermeasure in both data and computation 
sequence is developed and presented. Two efficient hardware architectures for original 
MPL algorithm are also presented by using binary and radix-4 representations, 
respectively.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has grown rapidly and it becomes a ubiquitous part of our modern 
society. One of the cornerstones for its success is users’ trust on secure data transaction 
over the Internet. Cryptography provides many core services for the network security to 
ensure such trust. For instance, public key cryptography is famous for its strong security 
strength and is frequently used as initial key exchange between two parties over insecure 
communication channel. However, in many practical scenarios, attackers are able to 
access the cryptographic device and gain information about internal data by monitoring 
the physical information released from the device. Such attacking methodology is 
introduced in [24], [25] and named Side Channel Attacks (SCA). 
Modular exponentiation (ME), the most demanded computation in RSA public 
key cryptosystem, is extensively targeted by SCAs. Unprotected ME algorithm offers 
various possibilities for SCAs because the “leakage” physical information released by 
cryptographic device is greatly associated with ME algorithm. Carefully designed ME 
algorithms with proper countermeasures could result in more regular side channel signals 
which may not be taken advantage of by the attackers easily. For instance, Montgomery 
Powering Ladder (MPL) can provide resistance to one of the most popular SCAs, Simple 
Power Analysis (SPA). Because MPL always maintains regular operations throughout its 
process and has no redundant computations, the corresponding power consumption 
signals release little information making SPA no longer applicable. 
It has been shown that MPL is not immune to all types of SCAs. For example, 
MPL remains sensitive to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) which is a powerful SCA 
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that extracts the leakage of information related to power consumption. Differential Power 
Analysis (DPA) is first described by Kocher et al. in [10]. Many follow ups can be found 
in [17, 20, 21, 25, and 30] and among which, [21, 30] are specially designed attacks for 
breaking MPL. 
Coron pointed out [9] that DPA may be prevented by randomizing the group, the 
exponent or the base element. The following research work was focusing on masking 
techniques targeting the exponent and the base element which can be shown as examples 
in [22, 26, and 28]. However, they have all been proven ineffective toward later proposed 
attacks [21, 27, 29] respectively. Other than protecting the exponent and the base element, 
another algorithmic countermeasure is proposed by changing the procedure of ME 
algorithm and is referred to as Sequence Masking technique in [21]. One example is 
Square-and-multiply-always method which is effective in hiding computation sequences 
but vulnerable to safe-error attack. 
In this thesis an improved sequence masking technique is proposed. Based on the 
proposed technique, a modified MPL algorithm with countermeasures of randomization 
on exponent and the base element is developed. It has been shown that the new modified 
MPL algorithm could provide protection to more SCAs than any other existing MPL-like 
algorithms. 
The thesis is organized as the following chapters. Chapter II gives an overview of 
asymmetric cryptography system where MPL is put into application and introduces SCA 
and explains why it is a serious threat. MPL as well as its natural resistance toward SCAs 
is also depicted. Then, Chapter III explains the philosophy that existing works use to stop 
SCA. Then it states the existing works have very little power before certain advanced 
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SCAs, thus new countermeasures are in need.  
Chapters IV to VII depict proposed works. In Chapter IV, two efficient 
architectures for modular exponentiation are proposed respectively using MPL algorithm 
and radix-4 MPL algorithm. It follows a novel sequence masking technique, which is 
described in Chapter V. In Chapter VI, a new modified MPL algorithm with 
countermeasures is proposed and analyzed. Its hardware implementation is described in 
the following chapter VII.  Chapter VIII concludes the contributions of this thesis and 
describes some possible future work.  
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CHAPTER II 
PUBLICK KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS 
2.1 Asymmetric Cryptography 
In key generation point of view, there are two types of cryptographic techniques, 
namely, symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography. Symmetric cryptography 
uses the same key for both encryption and decryption, while asymmetric cryptography 
differentiates decryption key from encryption key. Asymmetric cryptography is also 
popularly known as public key cryptography.  
Assume that Alice and Bob are parties engaging a secure communication using 
cryptographic technique. In asymmetric cryptography, each of them has her/his own pair 
of public key and private key. The public key is placed in a public register accessible to 
the public while the private key is kept private and known to its owner only. 
Figure 2.1 Message deliveries in Public Key Cryptography 
 
In a scenario that Alice would like to send a confidential message to Bob, she 
looks up Bob’s public key and uses it as encryption key during encryption process. Upon 
Message 
from Alice Encryption 
Bob's 
Public Key 
Bob's 
Secret Key 
Decrytion 
Message 
Received 
By Bob 
Deliver
y 
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receiving the encrypted message from Alice, Bob interprets this message only by using 
his private key. In this example, two different keys are evolved in encryption and 
decryption process. The encryption key is Bob’s public key which is revealed to public. 
The decryption key is a private key that is only known by Bob. Thus, as the scheme 
illustrated in Figure 2.1, the scheme is able to allow Alice sending messages to Bob 
privately. Since Bob holds the only key that can be used to decrypt the encrypted 
message. 
It is well known that the feature of making a distinction between encryption and 
decryption key for public key cryptography can facilitate many unique 
cryptographic/secure services such like digital signature and key exchange. However, 
public key cryptography systems usually require significant higher computation cost than 
symmetric key systems as a trade off. Specifically, longer computation time and more 
memory room requirement are usually expected in public key cryptography systems.  
Therefore, it is very important to develop efficient algorithms for public key 
cryptosystems. For the popular public key cryptosystems such like RSA, the main 
computation cost is spent in performing modular exponentiation. This is why the research 
on efficient modular exponentiation algorithms has becomes a focus in this area.  
In real world practice of network security, symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptography are co-operated. Asymmetric cryptography realizes the initial key exchange 
with strong security strength, while encryption/decryption process is achieved by the low 
cost symmetric cryptography process. In conclusion, both cryptography systems play 
critical role. Their cooperation balances security strength and efficiency in network 
security. 
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2.2 RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
Two popular cryptosystems, RSA and ECC are explained in this section. RSA is a 
wildly used asymmetric cryptosystem and digital signature scheme. The invention of this 
scheme was in later 1970s at MIT, by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman in [1]. 
And such cryptosystem is named after the first digit of their last name. The strength of 
RSA is its mathematic difficulty in factorize  ( )       ( )   (   )(   ). The 
description of such system is given as follows. 
The cryptosystem holds the public key defined as (n,e) and the private key 
defined as (n,d). Where, the integer n is obtained by multiply two prime number p and q. 
e and d are exponents and they satisfy such requirements.  
         ( )       ( )  (   )(   ) 
The encryption and decryption process of RSA can be described as follows. Alice 
wants to send encrypted message to Bob. Thus, she use Bob’s public key (n,e) to 
compute            where c is the encrypted message. The legitimate receiver, Bob 
for this case, is able to decrypted c through his own private key (n,d) by computing 
         . The underlying equation can prove such encryption and decryption is 
valid and original message are assured to be successfully delivered. 
    (  )    (  )      (     ) 
RSA system can also be used as digital signature scheme. Bob wants to identify 
Alice. Therefore, Alice use her own private key (n,d) to “sign” a message to tell Bob “I 
am Alice”. Such purpose is fulfilled by computing c        . Since the private key 
(n,d) is unique, she is the only one in this world who can create such signature . And 
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Alice’s signature can be easily verified by decrypting using Alice’s public key (n,e) by 
computing         . The verification of such scheme is simple and straightforward.  
    (  )    (  )      (     ) 
According to [2], “the most notable features about RSA are its apparent simplicity 
and considerable elegance”. This sentence perfectly concludes RSA. Because of its 
simplicity and elegance, RSA is abundantly applied in the world of cryptography. 
Different than RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) has not been patented. 
The suggestion of using elliptic curve in cryptography is first published in [33] in 1985. 
This system uses the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) which can be 
defined as follows:  
Let  (  ) to be an elliptic curve over    and let P be a point in such curve. For 
any point    (  ) find the integer k, where         (#P is the order of P) such 
that      is an ECDLP. The basic operation in ECC is scalar multiplication    
{       }   there are k number of times additions. 
A quick example will illustrate as follows. Alice tries to send a signed message to 
Bob. They both share a point P on the same elliptic curve E. Bob has a private key    and 
private key    satisfy         . Because of the difficulty on solving ECDLP, making 
known to public of     and point P will not reveal private key   . 
Alice randomly generates an integer r and compute   . And then she encrypts the 
message m by computing         .where    is the public key of Bob. At last, Alice 
sends (  |  ) to Bob. 
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Bob decrypt the message from Alice by multiplying his secret key    with value 
of    . And then he subtracts the product from c.  Since    =    , thus          .  
Then the message is successfully decrypted as follows: 
                    
It is obviously shown that modular exponentiation is exhaustively used and 
appears nearly in nearly every derivation equations in RSA. On other hand, ECC has 
huge amount of scalar multiplication which shares many commons with modular 
exponentiation.  The significance of modular exponentiation is self-evident.  In summary, 
the research work on modular exponentiation has its meaning reflected in widely usage in 
popular public key cryptography like RSA and ECC etc.  
2.3 Modular Exponentiations and Montgomery Powering Ladder 
Algorithm 2.1.Left to right version of Square-and-Multiply method 
Input:    M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2 
Output: C = M
e
 
Step 1: Set R← M; 
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1 
Step 2a:  R←R2; 
Step 2b: if (ei=1) 
Then  R←R×M; 
Step 3: Return (C = R) 
 
One of the most naive fast modular exponentiation methods is Binary Method 
which represents the exponent in binary form. The basic idea is to take advantage of 
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binary expression of the exponent to do faster computation rather than direct multiply the 
base by some number of times.  
Binary Method, also known as Square-and-multiply is a very classical method and 
it is over 2000 years old. The left to right version starts at the exponent’s most significant 
non-zero bit and work downward to least significant bit. Pseudo code illustration is 
shown as follows. It shows in Algorithm 2.1 that at the beginning of each loop, the value 
in register R is squared. And whenever exponent bit     , R is multiply by . An 
equation is able to prove this algorithm’s correctness.  
e=en-1 2
n-1
+en-2 2
n-2…. +e1 2
1
+e0 2
0
= (… (en-1 2+en-2) 2+…..+e0)  
Module exponentiation is the most critical part because it is the most demanded 
computation in public key cryptography and have greatly influence to the computation 
overhead. Unfortunately it’s also the weakest and most vulnerable point in front of SCAs. 
In most case, since the secret information is part of the exponentiations parameters and 
the surrender of modular exponentiation will direct result in the compromise of secret 
information. Having resistance to Side Channel Attacks in Modular Exponentiation is 
very important. With such background, the application of Montgomery Powering Ladder 
[3] in cryptography causes great excitement for its nature resistance to Simple Power 
Analysis (SPA).  A comparison between Binary Method and MPL is disclosed in section 
2.5 of this chapter to show MPL’s advantages towards SPA. And in this section, we still 
focus on what is MPL. 
MPL was originally invented as an improvement of left to right binary algorithm 
towards SPA. And it is based on the following observation. [16] 
Let    ∑    
      
   
  ,        
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It is easy to get: 
{
                          
               
 
That shows the relationship between   and previous cycle value     and also the 
relationship between   and previous cycle value    . Moreover, we also found that to 
obtain        , there are always exist iteration where: 
 When     , {
        
            
 
 And when      ,  {
            
        
  
Notice that    and    have very similar expression structure. And    doubles itself 
when       and    doubles itself when         Moreover, the summation of      
     is assigned to    in case of       and to    in case of        
Algorithm 2.2.Montgomery Powering Ladder 
Input:    M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2 
Output: C = M
e
 
Step 1: Set R0 ← 1, R1← M; 
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1 
Step 2a:  if (ei=0) 
Then {Set R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 ;} 
Step 2b: if (ei=1) 
Then {Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12 ;} 
Step 3: Return (C = R) 
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As shown in Step2a and 2b of Algorithm 2.2, register R0 and R1 have 
corresponding iteration process as    and    in the exponent. The summation of      and 
     in exponent is carried out by a multiplication between R0 and R1.  And the doubles 
in      and      is realized by a squaring operation on R1 and R0 respectively. These 
operations are valid since the base value is always M throughout the exponentiation. 
Consider the computation overhead, MPL takes        multiplications on 
average. This may not as good as the performance in Square-and-multiply which takes 
around 3/2      on average.  Nevertheless, the capability for parallel computing makes 
this method more efficient than basic binary algorithms. In [16], Marc Joye and Sung-
Ming Yen exhibit that as:  
                                                       and          
  
, where     could be either         and       is the negation of      
It is obviously that calculations relate to       and the ones relate to     are 
independent. So, on a bi-processor, multiplication and squaring can compute at the same 
time. That results parallel version of the MPL nearly attains the optimal 200% speed-up 
factor over the standard one [16].  According to MPL’s capability of parallel computing, 
two efficient architectures are proposed in Chapter IV in this thesis.  
2.4 Side Channel Attacks 
Side channel attacks exploit the information leaked by the physical characteristics 
of the cryptographic modules during execution of the algorithm. The term “side channel” 
is used to describe the leakage of system information. Depends on what kind of leakage 
of system information SCA relies on, we can categorized it into several types as shown in 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Side Channels and Corresponding Side Channel Attacks 
Side Channels Side-channel Attacks 
Power Consumptions  Simple Power Analysis, Differential Power 
Analysis, Comparative Power Analysis etc 
Timing information  Timing Attacks 
Faults response  Safe-Error Attacks 
Electromagnetic Radiation EM Attacks 
 
-2.4.1 Power analysis attack 
Different operation in cryptographic algorithms consumes different powers. And 
these power variations can leak useful information about secret parameters. In worse case, 
the secret parameters can be fully recovered by careful statically analysis on these 
leakage information. Power analysis attacks proved to be very effective in attacking 
smart cards and other embedded systems. And it can be categorized into Simple and 
Differential Power Analysis (SPA and DPA respectively). In SPA, measured power 
traces are used for analyzing which particular instruction is being carried out at specific 
time. And this knowledge can lead to expose of secret parameters. DPA exploits more 
statistical method in analysis process. And it is considered as one of the most powerful 
SCAs for it requires relatively little resources [25]. Some of the DPAs will be detailed 
explained in chapter III section 3.4 in this thesis. Currently, we focus on describe the 
mechanism of SPA.  
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In order to illustrate the idea of SPA, consider an RSA encryption involves the 
computation of            , where   is modulus and  is the message need to be 
encrypted. Adversary’s goal is to know the secret key  .  
 
 
Figure 2.2 SPA reveals secret exponent in binary method 
 
In Square-and-Multiply algorithm (Algorithm 2.1), different instructions are 
carried out according to the value of secret exponent. In Step2b, the multiplication is 
conditional and only occurs at the case of      . In the other case of       , only 
squaring operation is performed. In another word, if adversary knows how to identify this 
conditional multiplication, he knows the value of secret exponent. Unfortunately, the 
multiplication is distinguishable in power consumption signals. As illustrate in Figure 2.2, 
each wave pulse represents the power consumption of running an operation. Operations 
could only be squaring or multiplication. Compare to multiplication, squaring operation 
usually consumes less power and therefore has lower amplitude in power traces. As a 
result, power traces can fully disclose which operation the cryptosystem was running by 
identifying the amplitude difference. Operation types are record at the top of 
corresponding wave pulses in Figure 2.2 where S represent squaring and M represents 
  
  
   
Power 
Trace
M 
S S S 
M 
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S 
 
 
S 
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multiplication. In the case of an S is followed by an M, which is highlighted as red wave 
pulses in Figure 2.2, the corresponding secret exponent must be 1 since the conditional 
multiplication is carried out and the triggering condition must be satisfied. Otherwise, as 
shown in green, only squaring is performed which indicates the secret exponent is 0. 
-2.4.2 Timing attack 
Cryptographic algorithms in majority of implementation execute the computations 
in a non-constant time. And these time variations sometimes related to secret exponent. 
Moreover, careful statically analysis on this leakage information may fully recover the 
secret exponent. First timing attack is proposed by Kocher et al. on 1996 [24].  He shows 
it is possible to use such timing attack to against RSA. More works can be found in [6, 
10]. 
-2.4.3 Fault Attack 
Fault Attacks try to introduce errors into cryptographic computation, and to 
identify the key by analyzing the mathematical and statistical properties of the 
erroneously computed results. [22] 
As illustration of the attack scheme, one of fault based attack mentioned by Sung-
Ming Yen and Marc Joye is explained as follows. In [12, 13], they descript the attack like 
this: By timely inducing a fault during the execution of an instruction, an attacker may 
deduce whether the targeted instruction is redundant: if the final result is correct then the 
instruction is indeed redundant (or dummy operation [13]); if not, the instruction is 
effective. This knowledge may then be used to obtain one or more bits of exponent. Such 
attacks are referred to as safe-error attack.  Since safe-error attack is able to check the 
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effectiveness of each operation, it is dangerous to have dummy operations in 
cryptographic algorithms.  More fault attacks can be found in [11, 34]. 
-2.4.4 EM Attack 
Electromagnetic (EM) radiation is considered as an extension of the power 
consumption leakage and the attacks/countermeasures are applied without change [17]. 
Instead of measuring power consumptions, Electromagnetic radiation can be an 
alternative leakage source used by adversary. More EM works can be found in [35]. 
2.5 Giving Protections in Algorithm Level 
One of the practical approaches to stop SCAs is to provide protections in ME 
algorithm level as refers to countermeasures. In this section, comparison between Square 
and Multiply Algorithm and MPL are given to show how improvements in algorithm 
level enhance its SCA resistances. 
Square-and-Multiply is vulnerable to SPA because it has a conditional statement 
that makes system operating differently and thus results in different power consumption. 
This has already been discussed in section 2.4.1 as a demonstration of SPA. 
MPL has shown more reliable resistance to SPA. First of all, as shown in 
Algorithm 2.2, it always performs a multiplication followed with a squaring. 
Consequently, there is no difference in power consumption regarding to computation on 
different exponents. Secondly, there is no dummy operation in the algorithm. The faults 
induced by safe-error attack always results in an incorrect exponentiation result.  Thus, 
no leakage information will release in erroneously computed results. 
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Table 2.2 Comparisons between MPL and Square-and-Multiply on simple SCA 
resistance 
 Square-and-Multiply MPL 
Multiplication 
Numbers 
2log n in worst case 
1.5log n  on average 
       constantly 
Resistance to 
SPA types attack 
Vulnerable Resistive 
Resistance to 
Safe-error attack 
Vulnerable Resistive 
 
As illustrate in Figure 2.3, a comparison is performed in ME algorithms regarding 
to power traces. Since Multiplication and Squaring is distinguishable by the amplitude, 
the operation types are disclosed by the power traces and record as M and S in the figure. 
Moreover, the secret exponents are listed below the exact wave pulse which is generated 
by computing such exponent. It is obvious that Square-and-Multiply and MPL have 
different power traces with inputting same secret exponents. Square-and-Multiply has 
recognizable power traces for conditional multiplications. On the other hand, MPL 
consistently performs multiplication with a squaring.  In [14], “Highly Regular” is used 
to evaluate an exponentiation algorithm. First, the algorithm is regular; which means will 
always repeat the same instructions in the same order for any inputs; second, it has no 
dummy operation which refers to the non-function operation padded within algorithm. 
Dummy operation doesn’t effective but in some cases it has to be executed. MPL is a 
“Highly Regular” exponentiation algorithm because the operation of MPL satisfies both 
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requirements. Meanwhile, Square-and-Multiply fails on the first requirement of “Highly 
Regular”.   
 
 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of Square-and-Multiply and MPL in power traces 
 
In conclusion, when taking into account simple Side channel attacks resistance, 
MPL has better performance than Square-and-multiply algorithm. The essential of such 
improvement is more regular instructions in iteration process. And the comparison also 
demonstrates that improvements in algorithm level can regulate the power consumptions 
and further enhance the SCA resistance.  
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CHAPTER III 
EXISTING WORK REVIEWS  
According to recent research, MPL is able to resist SPA but still vulnerable to 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA).  Therefore, many research works are proposing on 
MPL’s DPA countermeasures. Several existing works are mentioned in this chapter for 
their great inspiration and influence. Respect has to be given to those pioneers in this 
research field. In addition, their weaknesses are also concluded to show the potential of 
further improvements.  
3.1 DPA against MPL 
In order to illustrate MPL’s vulnerability to DPA, Relative Doubling Attack is 
explained as an example in this section. Relative Doubling Attack is proposed in [30]. 
Because the original doubling attack [20] does not apply to MPL, S.M Yan and etc 
noticed another doubling-like attack is applicable. It is based on the following 
observation: 
Recall the invention of MPL algorithm, Low and High Registers were defined as: 
 When     , {
        
            
 
 , and when     , {
            
        
 . 
It’s easy to notice two facts. 
Fact1. Given     , then we have         . 
Fact2. Given      , then we have           
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Assume two exponentiations are computing using MPL. They have specific 
inputs M and  . Therefore, the whole process is computing  mod N and (  ) mod 
N, where k is exponent and should be keep secret all the time. And N is modular number.  
It‘s easy to obtain that if           then, two squaring are performed as 
follows: 
{
   ( 
  )                                           
   (( 
 )    )                                        (  ) 
 
These two squaring are computing the same values because of         . Due to 
this observation of “Collisions” on computation, a new doubling-like attack can be 
mounted to derive the knowledge of          . Once two computations are found not 
coincidently identical, the triggering condition would be known if such computations are 
spotted. Such computations are called “Collisions”.  
For the same reason, it‘s also clear that if           then, 
{
   ( 
  )                                           
   (( 
 )    )                                        (  ) 
 
These two squaring are also performing same computation because           . 
And such leads to the knowledge of          . And for all the other case of    
    , there are not any collisions in the computation process. 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates an example of spotting collisions in power traces may 
harm the cryptosystem. Assume two separate messages are input to the system. These 
two inputs are carefully chosen as M and M
2
. The corresponding power traces for 
exponentiation of    and (  )  are indicated in Figure 3.1. Meanwhile, the 
corresponding values in registers R0 and R1 are recorded under the exact power pulses.  
Notice, these values and secret bits are used to provide better understanding of what the 
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internal data is in real time. They are no shown to the public. Only the power traces can 
be obtained from public. 
For case            or case          , or in another word, two adjacent 
zeros or ones in secret keys, a pair of squaring in adjacent iterations is processing the 
same data. As seen in highlighted blocks. Two collision was generated since there is two 
“1” in a row and two “0” in a row in exponent bits. The first collision results in two 
identical operations      in target and reference power traces. The second collision 
can be spotted in two        computations. 
 
Figure 3.1 Example of Relative Doubling Attack 
 
In [30], collision of two same squaring within    and (  )  at adjacent iteration 
lead to the knowledge of equivalence between two neighboring key bits. And since two 
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collisions are not distinguishable, the detection of collision will not reveal the value of 
the operand directly. However, the attacker is still able to conclude that once collision is 
detected, two adjacent key bits are the same. Otherwise, they are different. As a result, for 
given any bit in exponent, it is not difficult to figure out the rest. In addition, the most 
significant bit of exponent is often to be chosen as one. With such awareness, the private 
exponent is no longer secret. 
 Relative Doubling Attack is very effective to against MPL. It proves that MPL is 
considerable unsecure in front of DPAs. More other attacks can be found in [21, 34]. 
3.2 Coron’s Three DPA Countermeasures in ECC and RSA 
As illustrated in previous section, MPL cannot resist DPAs. As a result, many 
researchers are working on MPL’s DPA countermeasures. In [19], J.S. Coron inclusively 
concludes three types of DPA countermeasures in Elliptic Curve System.  These 
countermeasures are based on randomizing different parameters of scalar 
multiplication     .  And inducing randomization in scalar multiplication and modular 
exponentiation are well accepted method to against DPAs. Coron’s idea can be further 
extended into RSA cryptosystem. The third countermeasure of Coron refers to randomize 
the Group in RSA. This idea is not included in thesis. Thus, just first two 
countermeasures are detailed mentioned in this section.  In the last, the weakness of 
Coron’s work is explained in a specific example: Comparative Power Analysis [21]. 
-3.2.1 First countermeasure: Randomization of the Private Exponent  
Let    be the total number of points in Elliptic Curve. The scalar multiplication  
     can be realized by two steps. 
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 1. Compute             where k is a random number and its size is suggested 
to be 20 bits in practice. 
2. Compute the point      . 
Exponent d can be replaced by    in realization, because      . And 
      (      )                    
This countermeasure transfer scalar multiplication      to a new 
computation      . Since exponent d and     are related, the computation result Q will 
still be same. 
-3.2.2 Second countermeasure: Blind the point P 
The point P is masked by adding a random point R which also belongs to the 
same curve. And also       is known. Then scalar multiplication can be computed 
by  (   ). To recover      is just subtract (   ) with S. The mathematical proof 
is as follows. 
   (   )               
This countermeasure transfer scalar multiplication      to a new 
computation    (   )   . According to the above equation, the computation result 
is correct. 
-3.2.3 Third countermeasure: Randomization of Projective Coordinates 
The projective coordinates of a point are not unique thus the projective 
coordinates of P=(X, Y, Z) can be randomized by inducing a random number  . P is 
represented in a new projective coordinates of (        ) where     in the finite field. 
This countermeasure protects the binary representation of P in projective coordinates. 
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-3.2.4 First countermeasure in RSA: Randomization of the Private Exponent 
This countermeasure is also known as Exponent Masking. As the name indicates, 
it masks the exponent in order to protect the cryptosystem. The exponent masking 
technique for RSA is firstly disclosed in [22] invented by Adi Shamir.  
 
 
 
For computing     (     ), instead of set the exponent as e, we choose 
alternative exponent e’, where       ( )and   ( ) is the totient of modular n, and 
is   is a random number. Since:  
    
 
   ( )       ( )   ( )  (   (  ( )) )   ( ) 
And because  ( )   ( )     we could easily verify that  
  (   (  ( )) )   ( )  (   ( ) )   ( )       ( ) 
In Shamir’s Patten, the computation of         ( ) has the same result as the 
expected         ( ) . However, it actually computes different operands. The 
physical performance of alternative exponentiation is totally different, including power 
   
 
 
1 1
i t = phi(n) 
Black Box Public 
Key Scheme 
Replace x^d(mod n) 
By x^d(d+i*t)(mod n) 
Figure 3.1 A. Shamir's Patten for Exponent Masking [22] 
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consumptions and EM radiation features. Therefore, the private exponent is protected 
even if the whole computation is compromised.  The adversary only knows    is 
computed but still have no idea about original exponent  . Moreover, if the  ( ) is a 
relative small number, this technique can be very efficient. For instance, if n and d are 
1024 bit numbers, and r is a 32 bit random number as it recommended, d + r*t is a 1056 
bit number consequently and it only need to take extra 32 multiplications or squaring. As 
a result, this technique only cost 32/1024    extra computation.  
-3.2.5 Second countermeasure in RSA: Randomization of the Message 
This countermeasure is also known as Message Masking. Also as the name 
indicates, it masks the message to be encrypted to prevent the potential attacks. For 
computing       (     )  , in order to confuse the adversary, message m is 
transformed into other format. Following Coron’s idea, message m is randomized by 
multiplying with a random number R. Thus, the computation is transformed into    
(  )       . We say it is masked by random number r. It’s obviously that   doesn’t 
match the ordinary C. In order to recover the ordinary C, C’ need to be unmasked by 
multiply an anti-mask (   ) .  
                     (   ) (     )  (  )   (   ) (     )     (      ) 
In order to evaluate a message masking technique, the complexity of “Mask 
Updating” is always the most important criterion. For Coron’s second countermeasure, 
the mask r will be updated as the following equation specify.     
       (      )                                   
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If the mask won’t change as stays always as r, its update pattern is considered as a 
relatively weak masking technique. But Coron’s second countermeasure update the mask 
in a stable pattern and it is stronger than fixed masks.      
-3.2.6 Comparative Power Analysis against Coron’s Work 
Unfortunately, Coron’s two masking countermeasures are vulnerable to the 
proposed attack as suggested in [21]. Comparative power analysis attack is proposed by 
N. Homma et.cl in [21]. It can be applied to many standard implementations of the 
exponentiation, for instance, the binary Method, M-ary Methods and MPL. Similar to 
Relative Doubling Attack [30] mentioned in section 3.1, the basic idea of this attack is to 
input a pair of chosen messages to generate collisions. The two chosen inputs Y and Z 
have to be able to find the solution of       so that it can generate collisions. 
Computing Y as exponent gives a power trace including the target operation. The other 
input Z gives another power trace used as reference for it has a particular operation which 
is identical with target operation. In contrary to Relative Doubling Attack [30], the 
Collision was generated at two arbitrary time frames. And it’s claimed in [21] that, the 
two inputs have more flexible relationship. 
With the intention to find         to satisfy        the attacker can choose an 
arbitrary value r and can compute          and         , where         can 
be user customized.  
Let’s have an example for better understanding. In figure 5.2, the input condition 
was chosen as                           . The attacker was assuming to know 
the first four bits are     . If the fifth bit is one, the attacker can detect that collision 
was generated in two squaring operations at highlighted time frame. Otherwise, the fifth 
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bit is considered as zero. It’s simple to notice that the binary representation of decimal 13 
is       , and first four bits are       which is treated as attacker’s knowledge in the 
first place. Thus if the fifth key bits is one, the squaring at that time frame is 
computing    . 
 
Figure 3.2 Comparative Power Analysis Examples 
In the beginning, the attacker would choose the input condition          
according to his knowledge of revealed key bits. And then he can figure out the other 
input Z to create reference operation   . If fifth bit is one and because       ; we are 
expecting similarity for target and reference operation. Otherwise, fifth bit more likely to 
be zero.  And after repeated attacks, the secret key bits will be exposed one by one.  
And according to the analysis in [21], the Comparative Power Analysis is capable 
for cracking algorithm that carries both Coron’s second countermeasure [19] and 
Shamir’s exponent masking technique [22]. A valid example was shown in [21], assume 
input X is randomized by Coron’s second countermeasure as               where r is 
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a random number. Meanwhile, exponent E is randomized with a multiple of  ( ). The 
attacker will simple choose input X = -1. Thus, the exponentiation of    will turns 
into (  )  .  At the same time, the updating process for mask is essentially  . Notice that 
they are taking the same exponent. And with simple comparison in power traces, the 
randomized exponent      ( ) will be uncovered. Although the real exponent does not 
yield,     ( )  is equally useful. If the attacker repeats such attack, he would get 
another randomized exponent         ( ) with same E but different i. the subtraction 
for      ( )and          ( ) will gives a multiple of  ( ), which is sufficient to 
factorize N.  
3.3 Follow up Countermeasures on Exponent and Message Masking 
Two follow up countermeasures on exponent and message masking are brought 
up in this section, Exponent Splitting [26] and Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation 
[28]. These countermeasures are very effective and inspiring. Reviewing such 
countermeasures helps understanding the recent research results for masking technique. 
Their weaknesses are also included to show how they fail towards later proposed attacks. 
More specifically, High Order attack [27] is able to break Exponent Splitting Technique. 
And Masked MPL is vulnerable to Template Attack [29]. It also helps understanding the 
proposed algorithm presented later in this thesis. 
-3.3.1 Exponent Splitting 
The idea of data splitting was first abstracted in [26]. And in [23], the idea was 
used specific on exponent. Based on the simple observation of: 
          (   )               
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C. Clavier and M. Joye states in [23] that values of both r and (e -r) are required to 
recover the value of e. In other word, only one of the two exponentiations requires 
protection. Even though this statement was proved to be wrong in [27], it still gives an 
idea on we could split the exponent to thwart side channel attacks.  
The main idea of the splitting technique is to pick a random r (smaller than e) and 
to compute the value r’ = e− r. After that the recovery process is completed fairly easy by 
computing 
          
(    )            
  Exponent splitting technique has very high security strength but the cost is 
severe. Naturally it doubles the computation load. Thus it is considered less efficient than 
other alternative algorithms. Unfortunately, such technique is compromised to attack 
proposed in [27] which is explained the following section. Further enchantment for such 
technique is necessary.  
-3.3.2 High Orders Attack against Exponent Splitting 
Table 3.1Probability transition for different exponent bits 
Pr(    ’)           
Pr(0,0)            (    ) 
Pr(0,1)     (    )        
Pr(1,0)     (    )        
Pr(1,1)            (    ) 
                (    ) 
 
High Orders Attack is proposed in [27] by Frederic Muller and Frederic Valette. 
They discovered a hidden weakness of Exponent Splitting technique. That weakness was 
initiated with a very tricky statistic property.  Such property stays in the probability 
transitions of carry bits for different exponent bits.  
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Table 3.2 Imbalance probability for Exponent Splitting [27] 
                 5     7  8  9 ……..   9                 
(    ’) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 …….. 1 1 1 1 1 
Pr(0,0) 0 25 38 31 35 33 34 16 8 4 …….. 47 23 11 5 2 
Pr(0,1) 50 25 12 19 15 17 16 34 41 46 …….. 3 27 39 45 48 
Pr(1,0) 0 25 13 18 15 17 16 33 42 46 …….. 4 28 40 46 49 
Pr(1,1) 50 25 37 32 35 33 34 17 9 4 …….. 46 22 10 4 1 
 
The following equation is always satisfied: 
      
     
, where   is the carry bit in i-th iteration and            refer to the two random 
numbers that construct the real exponent E 
If we define    as the probability for the case of    , and Pr(    ’) as the 
probability for bracket case, we could have the probability transaction as summarized in 
Table 3.1. The probability for bracket cases belongs to a Markov chain, where next step’s 
probability can be derived from two previous probability transaction expressions. An 
example will further explain.  
Two random numbers      are generated to construct real exponent E for      
 .The Table 3.2 records the probabilities of all pair of ri and ri’ associated with the real 
exponent.  
For   is 0, then r0 and r0’can either be 00 or 11, each has 50 % chance. If   is 1, 
then r0 and r0’ will be either 10 or 01, each has 50% chance. We notice that after a long 
run of 0s in exponent bits, the   isapproaching to zero indicating no carry bits generated. 
And after a long run of 1s, (1-  ) is very close to zero showing a carry bit is propagating 
along with the computation. In fact, the statistical probability for r and r’ infers the value 
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of actual exponent. If adversary launch any attack methods suggested in [27], exponent 
splitting is not long safe. 
-3.3.3 Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation 
Algorithm 3.1. Masked Montgomery Powering Ladder 
Input:    M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2 ; 
       is the check sum of e 
Output: C = M
e       
Pick Random Number r  
Step 1: Set R0 ← r, R1←rM, R2← r-1    
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1 
Step 2a:  if (ei=0) 
Then {Set R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 , R2←R22, update (CKS,ej)} 
Step 2b: if (ei=1) 
Then {Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12, R2←R22 ,update (CKS,ej)} 
Step 3:                    
Step 4: Return (C = R0×R2) 
  
Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation is also known as Masked Montgomery 
Powering Ladder (AKA Masked MPL). It is first proposed in [28] by G. Fumaroli and D. 
Vigilant in 2009. It is a message masking technique based on Montgomery Powering 
Ladder algorithm.  At the very beginning, two register R0 and R1 is multiplicatively 
blinded by random picked number r in the same Group. All the intermediate values of R0 
and R1 are masked by the element    
   
  . 
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The register R2 is initialized with the anti-mask      , and such anti-mask is 
also updating during each iteration process. As a result, after n number of times 
iterations, the register R2 would hold   
   
  . And multiply R0 and R2 give the 
precise exponentiation results. In addition, in order to thwart potential fault attack and 
exponent or loop counter disturbance, an on-the-fly checksum function was used to fulfill 
such purpose.    
The updating pattern for the mask is    
   
  . Compare to Coron’s second 
Countermeasure’s mask updating as    , Masked Montgomery Powering Ladder has 
better randomness in mathematic point of view. It’s obvious that taking n as parameter, 
  
   
 has high order. And we are expecting more variation on the change for higher 
orders.  
Since Masked MPL keeps the same structure as the regular MPL, it inherits 
Montgomery Powering Ladder’s feature of Highly Regular, it’s intrinsically resistive to 
simple side-channel attacks as well as Safe-Error Attack.  
Other than resistance to simple side channel attack, Masked MPL contains 
improved resistance towards Differential Power Analysis and Fault Attacks. By means of 
masking all the computation intermediate value, the input is believed to be “statistically 
independent” [28] from output. Unless the random number r is revealed, or it is a weak 
mask, differential side-channel attacks can not apply in practice. And thanks to the 
Checksum function’s participation, most fault attack cannot pass the very last sum 
checking. Failure in such checking will cause the calculated results wiped.   
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-3.3.4 Template attack against Masked MPL 
Masked MPL is considered as a very strong countermeasure. Nevertheless, a 
template attack [29] is claimed to be a great threat to Masked MPL.  
C. Herbst and M. Medwed proposed a crypto-analysis in [29] that building a 
template to guess the operand of given operation by maximum-likelihood decision rule. It 
has been proved that it is effective to attack Masked Montgomery Ladder via guessing 
the value of random mask. Such template represents statistical properties of the power 
consumption for a given operation. It states in [29] that the power consumption of a 
device follows a multivariate normal distribution (MVN). Similarly like MVN, the power 
consumptions can be described by template consisted by a mean vector   and a 
covariance matrix  . And it also assumes that the adversary can model every possible 
occurring operation. Therefore, the adversary is able to fully characterize all possible 
operations and know the corresponding hamming weights. 
Since the adversary also knows the moments of time when the mask is operating, 
he can extract those points and apply the previously built templates to them. Therefore, 
adversary has the knowledge of the Hamming height of the mask as well as those of the 
partial products of the multiplication. 
So far, the adversary successfully extracts the Hamming weights of the processes 
data out of a given trace. In this case, the attack focuses on the masking operation     . 
Here starts the stage of so called Sieving Step [29] which can determine the mask   . The 
first part of sieving is to narrow down the mask candidate by knowing the exact 
Hamming weight. The second part is checking the hamming weight of partial products 
lead by left mask candidate.  
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The effectiveness for such attack is the same in 8bits and 16 bits system. 
However, for 32-bit platforms the sieving step becomes computationally infeasible. 
Although such attack is limited in low bit platforms so far, the solid standing for masked 
MPL has been challenged. Further enhancement is under demands. 
3.4 Sequence Masking 
Algorithm 3.2 Square-and-Multiply Always method 
Input:    M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2 
Output: C = M
e
 
Step 1: Set R← M; 
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1 
Step 2a:  R←R2; 
Step 2b: if (ei=1) 
Then  R←R×M; 
Step 2C: if (ei=0) 
Dummy Operation R×M; 
Step 3: Return (C = R) 
 
There is another method to against DPA other than Coron’s countermeasures. 
Sequence masking technique usually changes the procedure of exponentiation methods. 
One unsuccessful example is Square-and-Multiply-always method [19]. This method 
adds a dummy multiplication to standard Square-and-Multiply method to make it more 
balanced. As illustrated in Algorithm 3.2. When the exponent bit is equal to zero, the 
multiplication that is not necessary but used as a cover which can be referred as dummy 
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operation.  However, such dummy operation is vulnerable to safe-error attack and didn’t 
improve the strength of original algorithm. It becomes very easy to locate when it 
computes the multiplication R = R×M after the squaring.  And when exponent bit is equal 
to zero at this iteration, R = R×M’s result won’t affect the final result. This can be abused 
conversely. If some computational fault is induced to system when it computes R = R×M, 
it’s easy to know the exponent bit at that time frame by verifying whether the final result 
is correct or not.  
Sequence masking receives less attention and there is very few existing work. 
First, for given ME algorithm, it is difficult to changing the computation sequence. Non 
careful adjusting may ruins the computation correctness. Second, adding redundant 
operation is dangerous; it can be seen in example of Square-and-Multiply Always 
method. Nevertheless, sequence masking is a possible solution for DPA protection. And 
if it’s well adopted, such kind of technique is additive to exponent masking and message 
masking techniques.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PROPOSED ARCHITECTURES FOR MPL AND RADIX-4 MPL  
In this chapter, two new architectures for exponentiation are proposed. The first 
one is an efficient implementation of Montgomery power ladder algorithm (Algorithm 
3.2) by using its parallel computing feature. The second proposed architecture is based on 
a modified Montgomery powering ladder method (Algorithm 4). We firstly extend 
Montgomery ladder algorithm by applying loop unrolling technique to it. The resultant 
algorithm takes only half number of the loops to complete the exponentiation. A new 
architecture for this modified Montgomery ladder algorithm is then proposed. The 
hardware complexity and time delay of the proposed architectures are analyzed and 
compared. 
4.1 Proposed Architecture for Montgomery Power Ladder 
An efficient architecture for realization of MPL (Algorithm 2.2) is shown in 
Figure 4.1. Two registers R0 and R1 store the variables R0 and R1 in Algorithm 2.2, and 
they are initialized as 1 and M respectively. Registers R0 and R1 should be larger enough 
to hold the power M
k
. The exponent k is stored in the binary shift register k which shifts 
to the left by one bit every clock cycle. (In Figure 4.1, it is shown as a circular shift 
register.) Other hardware components include one modular multiplier, one modular 
squaring unit, one multiplexer, and one 2-by-2 cross-point switch.  
Assume that the modulus is M and has m bits. Then each of registers R0 and R1 
should be large enough to hold an m-bit number. Modular multiplier and modular 
squaring unit take input operand(s) of m-bit and generate output of m-bit.  The 
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multiplexer takes two inputs of m-bit number and selects one of them as the output 
depending on the select bit ki.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows one design of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch shown at the bottom 
of Figure 4.1. The implementation of the switch utilizes two multiplexers and it realizes 
the following function:  
 If E=0, then C=A, D=B; 
 If E=1, then D=A, C=B. 
The architecture works as follows. Registers R0 and R1 are initially loaded as 1 
and M, respectively. At cycle j,j=0, 1, …, n-1, exponent bit kn-1-jis the leftmost bit in 
Register k and controls both the multiplexer and the 2-by-2 cross-point switch. If kn-1-j 
=0, the output R0of register R0 is selected by the multiplexer and upon which the 
Figure 4.1.Architecture for Montgomery powering ladder 
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squaring operation is performed. Otherwise if kn-1-j =1, the output of register R1 is 
selected (R1) by the multiplexer and squaring operation is performed to generate R12.  
 
Figure 4.2 Implementation of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch in Figure 4.1 
 
The 2-by-2 cross-point switch works as follows. At cycle j, if kn-1-j =0, or the 
control input to the switch E=1, the switch is configured as two cross paths where the 
output of the multiplier is connected to the input to R1 and the output of the squarer is 
connected to the input to R0.  If kn-1-j =1, or E=0, the 2-by-2 switch is configured into two 
parallel paths. The output of the multiplier is then written into R0 while the output of the 
squaring unit is written into R1. 
During clock cycle j the architecture completes the computation in loop i=j in 
Algorithm 2.2. After n clock cycles, Register R0 contains the final result       . 
The complexity of the architecture includes one multiplier, one squarer, two 
multiplexers, and two registers. The critical path delay T is given by 
       {                              }           
     {                                       } 
It can be seen from Figure 4.2 that the time delay of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch 
is equivalent to that of one multiplexer. If we assume                         for very 
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large operand, then the critical path delay is                       .  The time delay 
taken to complete one exponentiation is         (                    )  
4.2 Proposed Modified Montgomery Power Ladder 
We apply the loop unrolling technique to the existing Montgomery power ladder 
algorithm by unrolling two loops into one. The resultant algorithm is shown in Algorithm 
4.1 as follows. 
Algorithm 4.1. Modified Montgomery Powering Ladder 
Input:    M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2 ; 
Output: C = M
e
 
Step 1: Set m ← (n-2)/2 if n is even;  
                   otherwise set m ← (n-1)/2 and kn← 0.  
Step 2: Set R0 ← 1, R1← M; 
Step 3: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1 
Step 3a:  if              
Then {Set R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 ,   
R1←R0×R1,  R0←R02 ;} 
Step 3b: if             
Then { Set R1←R0×R1,  R0←R02 , 
R0←R0×R1, R1←R12;} 
Step 3c:  if             
 Then {Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12, 
R1←R0×R1,  R0←R02 ;} 
Step 3b: if             
Then {Then { Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12, 
 R0←R0×R1, R1←R12;} 
Step 4: Return (C = R0) 
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4.3 Proposed Architecture for the Modified Montgomery Power Ladder Algorithm 
The proposed architecture to implement Algorithm3 is shown in Figure 4.3.  Two 
register R0 and R1, initialized as1 and M stores the variables R0 and R1 in Algorithm 
4.1, respectively.  
 
Figure4.3 Proposed Architecture for the modified MPL (Algorithm 4.1) 
   
  The two register should be large enough to hold the power  . The binary 
exponent k is split into two parts and they are stored in two shift registers, as shown in 
Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 Two shift register holding exponent bits 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4, Register K0 stores all the odd bits of the exponent k, …, 
k2i+1, …, k3, k1, whose output bit is used to control the top multiplexer and the top 2-by-2 
cross-point switch (Figure 4.2).Register K1 stores all the even bits of k, k2i, …, k2, k0, 
and its output bit controls the bottom multiplexer and the bottom 2-by-2 switch as shown 
in Figure 4.3.Other units include two multipliers, two squaring units, two multiplexers, 
and two 2-by-2 cross-point switches. The architecture can be roughly divided into two 
parts: the upper part works similar to that in Figure 4.1, except that the outputs of the 2-
by-2 switch become the inputs to the multiplier and squaring unit at the lower part, rather 
than are written back into R0 and R1 in Figure 4.1. The lower part of the architecture 
works also similar to that in Figure 4.1 except that the input to the multiplier and squaring 
units are the 2-by-2 switch in the upper part, rather than from the registers as in Figure 
4.1. 
The complexity of the architecture includes two multipliers, two squaring units, 
two multiplexers, two 2-by-2 switches, and two registers. The critical path delay   is 
given by 
       {                                                               
               } 
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     {                                                                    } 
Note that the delay of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch is equivalent to that of one 
multiplexer. The number of clock cycles required to complete one exponentiation is 
 (   )     
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CHAPTER V 
PROPOSED NOVEL SEQUENCE MASKING TECHNIQUE 
In this chapter, a novel sequence masking technique is proposed.  This technique 
is explained through the case of MPL. Then security analysis of propose technique is 
followed. Even the proposed technique can only resist the 
5.1 Applying on MPL 
Algorithm 5.1 Proposed sequence masking applying on MPL 
Input X, N,    (                 );    (                 ) 
Output:                      
Generating 2n bits random number Seq; 
Step 1: Set                          
Step 2: For i=2n-1 down to 0 do  
Step 2.1:  if              
Step 2.1a:  if                  
               
 } 
 
Step 2.1b:  if                   
 
{               
  
Step 2.1c:      shift to left; 
Step 2.2:  if              
Step 2.2a:  if                  
{               
  
Step 2.2b:  if                   
{               
 } 
Step 2.2c:         shift to left; 
Step 3: End for 
Step 4: Return           
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Proposed sequence masking technique can be applied to standard exponentiation 
methods. As a demonstration, the application on MPL is illustrated in Algorithm 5.1. The 
intention of this technique is to do two the modular exponentiations by a single 
computation core but in irregular sequences. Therefore, the computation sequence is 
randomized. In Algorithm 5.1, proposed masking technique creates a longer iteration 
sequence contributed by two exponentiations. At the beginning of iteration parts, the 
algorithm computes one of the two exponentiations depends on the value of      where i 
represent the number of iteration. Corresponding pairs of registers are also chosen to 
participate in the computation. The core operations match MPL algorithm with extra bit 
shift of exponent in the last step. After iteration part finished, two exponentiation results 
are stored in            separately. 
Two exponentiations            have exponent            respectively. 
                                 {                  }  n bits long 
                                 {                 }  n bits long 
Instead of computing them one after another, the iteration processes of the two 
exponentiations are merged into one. Since they are computed by a single computation 
core, if one is under computation, the other one is paused and all the intermediate values 
are stored in the memory. The switch point is decided by a 2n bits random number Seq. 
Each bit in Seq represents which exponentiation would be computed during this iteration.  
5.2 Security Analysis 
 The complexity of randomness induced can be represented by number of different   
computation sequences generated by proposed technique. For two practical 1024 bits 
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exponents, there could have      
5        (         )⁄   which is an incredible big 
number. Therefore, the proposed technique is able to prevent Brute Force Attack. 
And for many existing DPAs mentioned in chapter III, they are based on the 
assumption that target operation is always easy to locate and for sure occurs at same time 
frame over and over again. The intention of this technique is to randomize the 
computation sequence and therefore operations are hard to locate. The iteration process is 
doubled in proposed technique; the updating of iteration number is not longer fixed. 
Operations are no longer predictable and therefore randomness is induced in iteration 
process of exponentiation. An operation appears at same time frame in different attempts 
can belong to two different operations. Consequently, even the collision actually happens, 
it is difficult for the attackers to locate where it is. Thus, the collision itself can’t reveal 
any useful information.  
However, since these two exponentiations are independent. Attacker can induce 
fault to one of them to reveal the other exponentiation. Thus, the use of this technique 
must be careful. It also requires two exponentiations put together, sometimes this 
condition might not be applied. Nevertheless, the proposed technique can be further 
develop into a more complex countermeasure by combining with two exiting ideas which 
is fully described in next chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI 
PROPOSED MODIFIED MPL WITH COUNTERMEASURES  
In this chapter, based on previous proposed sequence masking technique, a 
modified MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1) is developed. It has similar 
structure as Algorithm 5.1. And Algorithm 6.1 does not only involve proposed sequence 
masking technique but also borrows two existing ideas. Exponent is randomized with the 
idea in [23], which is discussed in section 3.3.1. At same time, G. Fumaroli’s idea [28] 
mentioned in section 3.3.2 randomized the message. Borrowed ideas are also improved in 
proposed modified MPL algorithm with countermeasure. With adequate arrangement, the 
extra updating operation of message anti-mask is removed. More importantly, the 
vulnerability of [23] and [28] which are mentioned in section 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 are either 
eliminated or appended with proper protection. 
6.1 Algorithm Explanation 
The pre-computation is constructed several steps. The first step is random number 
generation. The original exponent E can be divided into two equal size randomized 
exponent        (    ).Another n bits random number   is utilized as random mask. 
Moreover,    
   is also brought into play with role of random mask for the second 
exponentiation and the anti-mask for the first exponentiation. After then,    
   is 
naturally updated along with the second exponentiation as the same pattern as the 
mask     in the first exponentiation. The update pattern would be   
        
and   
        .   
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Algorithm 6.1. Proposed Modified MPL with countermeasures 
 Input X, N, e=(en-1 … e1 e0)2 ; 
Output: C =X
e
 
Pre-computation:  
Step 1.  Generating n bits random number            ,  
and 2n bits random number     
Step 2.  Assign              (    )           
             
           
      
Step 3.                   
Computation: 
Step 4: For i=2n-1 down to 0 do  
Step 4.1:  if               
Step 4.1a:  if                  
{               
 } 
Step 4.1b:  if                   
{               
 } 
Step 4.1c:       shift to left;  
Update (    ,  ); 
Step 4.2:  if              
Step 4.2a:  if                  
{               
  
Step 4.2b:  if                   
{               
 } 
Step 4.2c:       shift to left; 
Update (    ,  ); 
Step 5: End for 
Step 6: 
                    
                    
Step 7: Return          
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The last step for pre-computation is initialization of a similar fault detection 
method proposed in [28]. It uses Checksum function to prevent possible fault attacks. 
Notice that all the random number generated in the pre-computation will refresh at the 
beginning of new round of exponentiation.   
In the iteration process, two sets of exponentiation are taking turns to compute 
according the value of Seq at that iteration. Each set exponentiation has its own pair of 
registers for storing the intermediate values. Register           are reserved for first 
exponentiation and           are used only by second exponentiation. Accordingly, 
values between two exponentiations won’t cross over each other. Whenever Seq equals to 
zero,            are computed. Otherwise,           are involved instead. After the 
iteration part, the fault detection is implemented by the XOR computation between final 
results of each exponentiation and Checksums. And final adjustment is followed as the 
product between          . 
The correctness proof is demonstrated as follows.  
The first exponentiation is     
          and second exponentiation is   
  
             , where       represent the individual iteration number for first and 
second exponentiation respectively. They are not counting in the algorithm since they 
always satisfy          . 
It could conclude as follows. 
                (  
        )  (  
           ) 
Because           at the end of exponentiation. 
(  
        )  (  
           )              
Table 6.1 Efficiency analysis for proposed Algorithm 6.1 
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Countermeasures Multiplication Squaring Register Needed Iteration Times 
Masked MPL Log N 1.5 Log N 4 N 
Exponent Splitting 2 log N 2 log N 6 2N 
Proposed 
Algorithm 6.1 
2 log N 2 log N 7 2N 
 
6.2 Efficiency Analysis  
 Compare to Masked MPL and Exponent Splitting, the proposed countermeasure 
has relative lower speed and higher memory requirement as shown in Table 6.1. However, 
as mentioned in section 3.3.2 and 3.3.4, existing works have weakness towards attacks 
proposed in [27 and 29]. While proposed modified MPL with countermeasures is more 
resistive towards these attacks. More detailed security analysis is included in next section.  
6.3 Security Analysis 
Proposed modified MPL with countermeasures can prevent the launching of a 
series attacks. The security analyses toward these attacks are listed in this section. 
-6.3.1 Against Simple Side Channel Attacks 
Simple Side Channel Attack has no effect on MPL because of its feature of 
Highly Regular.  Proposed modified MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1) does 
not change this feature. It still always has the same operation regardless to the inputs. 
And it does not have any dummy operations. Consequently, Simple Power Analysis as 
well as Safe-error attack has no effect on proposed countermeasure.  
-6.3.2 Against Relative Doubling Attack and Comparative Power Analysis 
These two attack share the same principle of choose specific inputs with the 
purpose of generating Collisions. And these have been discussed in section 3.1 and 3.4.6. 
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However, in proposed Algorithm 6.1, such type of attack will have little use. First of all, 
the reference power traces is generated at second attempt. And different attempts will 
have different secret exponent because exponent is randomly split into two parts and each 
part is computed separately. Second, the sequence procedure is randomized. The target 
operation is more likely shift to other slots and therefore the comparison between target 
and reference are meaningless. Third, at each step, all the intermediate values are masked 
by multiplying with random mask    or    
  , even the same operation is coincidently 
generated in target and reference, the corresponding power traces will look differently. 
And as long as the mask    remains secret, all the in-between computation appears like 
random squaring and multiplication. Moreover, all random masks will regenerate at the 
beginning of new input. For a new round of exponentiations, a different pair of mask and 
anti-mask will generate correspondingly. As a result, repeating attack can be effective 
prevented. 
Figure 6.1 is an illustration for proposed countermeasure against Relative 
Doubling Attack. All the intermediate values for the corresponding power traces are 
shown under the power traces. Two split exponents Secret Bits_0 and Secret Bits_1 are 
record in the table right above the corresponding power traces which are released during 
the computation of these secret bits. Notice when Secret Bits_0 is under computation, 
Secret Bits_1 is not displayed, since only one of them is computed. Random number Seq 
is also listed. Whenever it equal to zero, Secret Bits_0 is computed. Otherwise, Secret 
Bits_1 is involved. Relative Doubling Attack checks the adjacent iteration between 
reference and target power traces to see if there any collision generated. The first 
comparison would be as the red blocks highlighted in Figure 6.1.  The comparison results 
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must be different since it compares           and               . However, 
it can’t conclude that adjacent secret bits are not same. Since in the case of Figure 6.1, 
two adjacent exponents belong to two different exponentiations and the similarity of 
these two bits makes no sense. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Algorithm 6.1 against Relative Doubling Attack 
 
 And the second comparison is highlighted by the green blocks. Two operations 
are indicated as         and              . Even the unmasked computation 
is coincidently to be same as     , but since the masks            are different, 
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they still look differently in power traces.  From two above example, it’s clear that 
comparison between two adjacent iterations has no use. The hidden relationship used by 
Relative Doubling Attack is destroyed in proposed modified MPL with countermeasures. 
Comparative power traces shares the similar attacking scheme. Even two 
operations under comparison have more arbitrary relationship; such relationship is also 
destroyed in proposed algorithm.   
-6.3.3 Against Template attack 
Template attack mentioned in section 3.3.4 is still very effective on violent the 
masking process      . The following analysis shows why even the mask root   is 
compromised; the whole Algorithm 6.1 is still not cracked. Assume the mask root   is 
revealed to attacker, the next following step would be calculating the masks for all 
iterations based on the updating pattern  
   
  .  The challenge comes with figuring out 
iteration number i. Since the iteration process is modified and randomized, the mask 
update as    
   
  , and iteration number i is different in first and second 
exponentiations. Two exponentiations have their own iteration number and these 
numbers are highly affected by the random number Seq which is safely store in register in 
most of time. In another word, template attack is able to successfully reveal the mask root  
  . But, with sequence randomized, the mask updating pattern is still secure. And 
consequently, the algorithm as one is not compromised.  
-6.3.4 Against High Order Attack and Combined attacks 
High Order Attack mentioned in section 3.3.2 is difficult to launch on propose 
modified MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1). Since, even though, the imbalance 
statistic property in two split exponents still exists, the adversary has difficulty to collect 
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enough samples to analysis such probability. For example, in order to analysis the 
percentage for case   (    ’) =  (   ), the adversary have to detect case of (     ’) = (0, 
0) first and then account the number of such case in order to statistic the percentage. In 
another word, high order attack requires two exponentiations are accessible in the first 
place. This requires it combined with other attacks to crack individual exponentiation. As 
mentioned in section 3.3.1, each individual exponentiation in Exponent Splitting has no 
addition protection. Any simple SCA is able to crack them. Therefore, high order attacks 
combined with simple SCA is able to break Exponent Splitting. In contrary to this 
situation, the split exponentiation in Algorithm 6.1 has additional protection. The 
intermediate values and computation sequences are masked by random number.  In order 
to launch High Order Attack, other attack has been induced to break both split 
exponentiations. 
Let’s see consider simple power analysis. Since Highly Regular is still apply to 
each split exponentiation. SPAs have no use at all in this case. Relative Doubling Attack 
or Comparative Power Analysis has no use either towards split exponentiations either. 
With computation sequence randomized, Algorithm 6.1‘s power traces do not follow the 
same time schedule. Same operation can be shifted to other time slots in different 
attempts. Analysis in section 5.2 shows the functionality of sequence randomization 
against these two attacks.  
Let’s see consider the case that High Order Attack is combined with Fault attack 
and Template Attack.  Message masks are the first barrier; even though masked MPL is 
crack-able in masking process using template attack. Attacker still has no idea about the 
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updating pattern for these masks because of randomized sequence, which is the second 
barrier. 
Since the random number Seq does not involve in any computations, but only 
used for branching criteria. It’s considered very secure. Though, it favors the attacker that 
the sequence procedures highly sensitive to fault inducing since two exponentiations are 
independent during the computation process. The fault induced to any computation 
makes the related computations faulty but have no effect on the other exponentiation. It 
distinguishes two exponentiations and eventually makes secrecy of computation sequence 
nonsense.  
Such scenario is still worry free. First of all, if the fault attack is based on bit 
manipulating, it’s difficult for attackers to find out a non-fault reference. Since all the 
intermediate values are masked by random number including the faulty results. 
Adversary cannot distinguish the faulty and normal values. 
 Even we assume there is a fault attack that is able to instantly notice the fault 
without reference; such assumption will not harm the security of Algorithm 6.1. Because 
fault attacks are destructive, the data involved with fault cannot be recovered. In another 
word, if any fault attack is induced to one exponentiation, it actually mess the data up and 
attackers have no way to recover it. Although the other exponentiation can be 
distinguished by then, the characteristic of exponent splitting decides that knowing only 
one of the two exponents is not adequate to disclose the origin exponent. For High Order 
Attack, it requires that both split exponents (    ’) has to be known to launch. Knowing 
only one of them is not sufficient. 
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Repeated collecting one of both split exponents (    ’) has no use either. Since the 
number collected can either belongs to         ’. It is impossible to classify the detected 
samples into two groups. Beside, with Checksum function in the end, many fault attack 
will be stopped at that point.  
In conclusion, the above security analysis shows that the proposed 
countermeasure is able to help building a more resistive power trace. And such power 
trace can stop simple SCAs, relative doubling attack, comparative power analysis and 
template attack. In addition, high order attacks combined with above attacks can also be 
stopped. Any other attacks share the same philosophy with attacks list above can be 
prevented too. 
6.3 Summary 
Even though, the proposed countermeasure has relatively less overall efficiency 
compare to the previous works, the main contribution for proposed work emphasis on the 
resistance towards SCAs in algorithm level. As mentioned in previous chapters, existing 
works of MPL enhancement are proven to be unsafe. However, the proposed modified 
MPL with countermeasure is able to produce more resistive power traces towards SCAs. 
It randomizes not only exponent, but also the message and computation procedure in 
contrary to only one in previous works. Besides, mask and anti-mask for messages are 
more efficient updated and neutralized compare to Masked MPL. No additional updating 
and mask removing process are needed.  The elimination of individual anti-mask 
updating process has great advantage. The anti-mask updating process in [28] can be 
easily located and be abused. In contrary, for proposed countermeasure, updating process 
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is naturally complete along with exponentiation. Since it can’t be separated from major 
operations, there are little chances being spotted by adversary. 
 
Table 6.2 Countermeasures versus SCAs. 
SCAs Doubling 
[20] 
2003 
High 
Order 
[27] 
2006 
 
Relative 
Doubling 
Attack[30] 
2006 
Fault 
Attack 
[34] 
2009 
Template 
[29] 
2009 
Comparative  
Power  
Analysis[21] 
2010 Countermeasures 
MPL [3] 
1987  
     
 
  
Coron’s  
[19] 
1999 
   
 
√ 
 
  
Shamir’s [22] 
1999 
   
 
√ 
 
  
Exponent 
Splitting 
[ 23] 
2001 
√   
 
√ 
 
√ 
Masked MPL 
[28] 
2006 
√  
 
√   √ 
Proposed 
Algorithm 6.1 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
In Table 6.2, it summarized the security strength comparisons between the 
proposed modified MPL with existing works. SCAs are listed on the top row. At each 
row, the first column is name of the countermeasure. The rest columns represent 
countermeasures’ resistance toward corresponding SCAs in forms of different symbols. 
Where check “√” indicates such countermeasure have resistance to this SCA. Cross “   
represents this countermeasure is vulnerable to such SCA. If blank is left in this column, 
it means such SCA is not applicable to this countermeasure.  And it’s clearly indicated in 
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Table 6.1 that existing works all has certain vulnerability. Among which, MPL’s 
weakness can refer to section 3.1. The limitation of Coron’s work [19] and Shamir’s 
pattern [22] has been discussed in section 3.4.6.  Exponent Splitting [23] has been proven 
unsecure in section 3.3.2. And Masked MPL’s weakness is summarised in section 3.3.4. 
In contrary, proposed algorithm is able to stop the listed SCAs as mentioned in detail 
analysis in section 6.3.  
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CHAPTER VII 
HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION FOR PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURE 
In this chapter, the hardware implementation for proposed modified MPL with 
countermeasure (algorithm6.1) is explained. The hardware programming language is 
chosen as Verilog for its user friendly programming style and nice popularity. And such 
Verilog implementation has been downloaded and tested on the Side-channel Attack 
Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO)-GII [31].  
The proposed hardware implementation referenced two IP cores. The credit must 
give to the owner of these IP cores. The first IP core is an AES implementation belongs 
to the developer group of (SASEBO) [32]. It also includes the windows based Host PC 
application and example FPGA programming code. The Second IP core is an exhaustive 
Verilog solution of RSA implementation using Square-and-multiply (Algorithm 2.1) 
which can be obtained in [38]. It is copyrighted by AIST and Tohoku University. These 
two IP cores greatly benefit proposed hardware implementation.    
7.1 SASEBO-GII  
SASEBO-GII is a newly developed FPGA board by National Institute of 
Advanced Industrial Science and Technology of Japan (AIST). It is suitable for 
experiments such as one for security evaluation for a comprehensive cryptographic 
system combining various elemental technologies or one for a large circuit implemented 
with a variety of countermeasures. The board carries the latest Xilinx Virtex-5 
LX30/LX50 as the target FPGA for implementation evaluation.  
The further specification follows: 
Two Xilinx FPGAs 
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– Cryptographic FPGA: XC5VLX30 or XC5VLX50 -1FFG324 (Virtex-5 series) 
– Control FPGA: XC3S400A-4FTG256 (Spartan-3A series) 
– The on-board oscillator provides the control FPGA with a clock signal of 24MHz. An 
external clock input is also supported. 
– External power source supplies the on-board power regulators and the FPGAs with 5.0 
V. The power regulators convert the 5-V input into 3.3 V, 1.8 V, 1.2 V, and 1.0 V for the 
FPGAs. The core voltage of 1.0 V of the cryptographic FPGA can also be applied 
directly through the external power connector. 
– Shunt resistors are provided to insert on the core VDD and/or ground lines of the 
cryptographic FPGA for measuring power traces. 
 
Figure 7.1 Top-level block diagram of SASEBO-GII 
 
As Figure 7.1 indicates, there are two FPGAs cooperate with each other. The 
control FPGA is mainly responsible for input and output converting, memory access and 
USB communication with Host PC etc. On the other hand, cryptographic FPGA carries 
the algorithm logic and mathematical computation. The realization for proposed work is 
executed in cryptographic FPGA. 
Cryptographic 
Application 
 
Windows-PC 
(Software)
User Interface 
 
USB 
Cryptographic 
FPGA 
Control 
FPGA 
EEPRO
M 
SASEBO-GII 
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Xilinx Download cable is used for downloading designed program into SASEBO-
GII. It connects the host pc with a USB cable and has 14pins J-Tag on the other end for 
programming the on board SPI memory.  
All downloaded programming file are generated in Xilinx ISE13.2 environment. 
The Host PC is supported by Microsoft .Net Framework 3.5 and a FTDI D2XXX driver 
for USB communications. 
7.2 HDL Simulation 
HDL simulation is carried out in Xilinx ISE 13.2 Isim® simulation environment. 
The programming language is Verilog. The simulation takes 18,992,218 clock cycles to 
compute a 1024 bits long secret key using 1024 bits modular and plaintext. And 
encrypted message is outputted in the end in terms of 32 bits data string.  
 
Table 7.1 Hardware usage of FPGA implementation of proposed modified MPL 
(Algorithm 6.1)  
 Utilized Available 
in the 
system 
% of 
use 
Number of Slice 
Registers 
4934 19200 25% 
Number of Slice 
LUTs: 
3662 19200 19% 
Number of IOs: 47 220 21% 
Number of 
BUFG/BUFGCTRLs: 
2 32 6% 
 
Number of DSP48Es: 4 32 12% 
 
7.3 Synthesis Result 
 The HDL is synthesized for Xilinx XC5VLX30 using Xilinx ISE 13.2. Table 7.2 
summarized the hardware resource usage of the processor in FPGA implementation. 
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According to synthesis report, the processor operates at 78.927MHz. The operation time 
for 1024 bits data is 240.71ms.  
This hardware implementation is tested on SASEBO-GII. Figure 7.4 shows the on 
board waveform captured by Chipscope® at results outputting. 
7.4 Summary 
Table 7.3 shows hardware usage of different algorithms adopted in SASEBO-GII.  
Compare to Square-and-multiply and MPL, the proposed hardware implementation 
roughly doubles the cost. Existing work of exponentiation algorithms mentioned in this 
thesis focus more on algorithm level design. And there are very few existing hardware 
implantations for MPL with countermeasures. Some of them are summarized in table 7.4. 
Implementations of [37, 39 and 40] are proposed for speed concerns. Among them, 
modular exponentiations algorithms used in [39 and 40] are MPL without 
countermeasures. And implementation in [37] uses MPL with exponent blinding which is 
a weak countermeasure mentioned in section 3.4.2. Proposed implementation is 
committed to different purpose. It is used to secure the modular exponentiation rather 
than improve the speed. Therefore these implementations are not comparable. 
Hardware implementation in [36] is proposed to secure RSA digital signature 
scheme using residue number system (RNS). And its area cost is slightly more comparing 
to proposed hardware implementation. 
The goal of proposed hardware implementation on SASEBO-GII is for next stage 
power trace analysis. This implementation doesn’t emphasis on the speed or execution 
time. In contrary, time consuming architecture is used to benefit the power trace 
monitoring. Since there is only one 32 bits multiplier, all operations associate with 
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multipliers are more predictable in power traces. Future work on power trace analysis can 
provide more solid proof of proposed Algorithm 6.1 has better resistive feature in 
algorithm level. 
 
Table 7.2 Hardware usage of different algorithms implemented on SASEBO-GII 
 
Number 
of Slice 
Registers 
Number 
of Slice 
LUTs 
Number 
of IOs 
Number of 
BUFG/BU
FGCTRLs 
Number of 
DSP48Es 
Clock 
Cycles 
Square and 
Multiply [38] 
1715 2481 47 1 4 7,002,329 
MPL 1725 2481 47 1 4 9,491,606 
Proposed 
Algorithm 6.1 
4934 3662 47 2 4 18,992,218 
 
Table 7.3 Exponentiation circuit performance for 1024 bit 
 
Number 
of Slice 
Registers 
Number 
of Slice 
LUTs: 
Technology Frequency 
Max Ex. 
Time 
MPL without 
countermeasure[40] 
2001 
6633 - xc40250xv 45.66M 11.95ms 
MPL without 
countermeasure[39] 
2007 
3937 - 
xc4vfx- 
10sf363 
200/400M 1.71ms 
MPL with 
Exponent Blinding 
[37] 
2008 
3899 6931 Xc3s5600e 119M 7.95ms 
RNS SCA Protected 
Exponentiation 
Algorithm [36] 
2003 
4956 16370 Xc2v6000 50M 158ms 
Proposed 
Implementation of 
Algorithm 6.1 
4934 3662 Xc5vlx30 78.9M 240.71ms 
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Figure 7.2 Architecture of proposed modified MPL with countermeasures 
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Figure 7.3 Block diagram of Cryptographic FPGA for realizing Algorithm 6.1 
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Figure 7.4 On board waveform of data outputting 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 A summary of contributions  
This thesis contributes the efficiency by proposing two efficient architectures for 
modular exponentiation respectively using Montgomery powering ladder algorithm and 
m-ary powering ladder method which is mentioned in Chapter IV. And further 
enhancements on the security strength of MPL are proposed via two cryptographic 
computation countermeasures. Firstly, a novel sequence masking technique is proposed 
in Chapter V for masking computation sequence for two individual modular 
exponentiations. And then, it is further developed into a modified MPL algorithm with 
countermeasures to frustrate a series of SCAs in Chapter VI. Compare to existing work, 
proposed modified MPL with countermeasures is less efficient but has better resistance.   
In addition, the hardware implementation for proposed modified MPL with 
countermeasures is illustrated in Chapter VII. 
8.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this thesis, a modified MPL algorithm (Algorithm 4.1) has been 
proposed which reduces the number of loops by half. Two efficient hardware 
architectures (Figures 4.1 and 4.3) have also been presented for the Montgomery ladder 
algorithm and the modified Montgomery ladder algorithm, respectively.  
 Besides, the proposed novel sequence technique (Algorithm 5.1) is able to be 
effectively against comparative power analysis and chosen message attacks mentioned in 
chapter III. In order to solve the problem of Algorithm 5.1’s sensitivity to fault attack, 
two existing ideas have been adapted and combined with the proposed sequence 
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technique to form a modified and enhanced MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1) 
The comparison to existing work in chapter VI shows proposed Algorithm 6.1 has 
relatively less overall efficiency but more emphasis on the strong resistance towards 
SCAs in algorithm level. As shown in Table 6.2, proposed Algorithm 6.1 is able to stop 
DPAs like doubling attack [20], high order attack [27], relative doubling attack [30], fault 
Attack [34], template attack[29], Comparative  Power Analysis[21]. 
8.3 Possible future work 
The proposed efficient architectures (Figures 4.1 and 4.3) are applied the ME in 
RSA. In the future, they are expected to be extended for Montgomery powering ladder 
for elliptic curve scalar multiplication.  
In addition, power trace analysis through oscilloscope can be launched on the 
hardware implementation of proposed modified MPL algorithm (Algorithm 6.1). Since 
the hardware implementation is realized on SASEBO-GII which is specialized circuit to 
evaluating SCA resistance. The FPGA power consumption is able to be monitored by 
probing assigned port. DPAs mentioned in chapter III will launch to SASEBO-GII while 
proposed Algorithm 6.1 is running. The corresponding power waveforms will be 
analyzed to verify the theoretical analysis.  
 Moreover, the hardware implementation in chapter VII is build for waveform 
monitoring. The optimization of running time and resources usage were not carefully 
concerned. It can be further improved to reduce running time and system resources usage. 
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APPENDICES 
SELECTED HDL PROGRAMMING CODES 
/************************************************************* 
*** RSA1024_RAM.v *** 
*** Yiruo He *** 
*** Aug. 16 2012 *** 
**************************************************************/ 
/* This is a top module for RSA encryption. It will receive 1024 bits key, modular and plaintext from 
data port Kin, Min, Din respectively. The encrypted message outputs from data port Dout. 
It contains two component modules RSA_MultiplicationBlock and RSA_SequenceBlock */ 
 
module RSA ( Kin, Min, Din, Dout, Krdy, Mrdy, Drdy, RSTn, EN, CLK, BSY, Kvld, Mvld, Dvld );    
    
   input         CLK, RSTn, EN; 
   input [31:0]    Kin, Min, Din; 
   input     Krdy, Mrdy, Drdy; 
   output     BSY; 
   output [31:0]  Dout; 
   output     Kvld, Mvld, Dvld; 
    
   reg [1023:0]    Krg, Krg_1,RND; 
reg [2047:0]    Seq; 
   wire [4:0]     count; 
   wire [1:0]     InOutMem; 
   wire [2:0]     state; 
   wire [31:0]   w_data, d_out, r_data_m, r_data_s, r_data0, r_data1,r_data2, r_data3, d_in; 
   wire [30:16]  MBCon; 
   wire [8:0]    MemCon_m, MemCon_s, MemCon0, MemCon1, MemCon2, MemCon3, MemCon_i, 
MemCon_o; 
   wire [1:0]    MemSel; 
   wire [1:0]     DSel; 
   wire     v, sign,FM; 
   wire     EnKey; 
   wire     key_bit, seq_bit; 
    
   parameter     INIT     = 3'h1; 
   parameter       IDLE     = 3'h2; 
   parameter       KEY_GET  = 3'h3; 
   parameter       MOD_GET  = 3'h4; 
   parameter       DATA_GET = 3'h5; 
   parameter       DATA_OUT = 3'h6; 
   parameter       ENCRYPT  = 3'h7; 
 
   always @(posedge CLK) begin 
     if (RSTn == 1'b0) begin 
   Krg <= 1024'h0; 
   RND <=1024'h0; 
   RND[31:0]<=  32'h00000000;  
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   Krg_1 <= 1024'h0; 
   Seq <=2048'h0; 
    end     
   else if (state == KEY_GET) begin 
    Krg <= {(Kin-RND[31:0]), Krg[1023:32]}; 
    Krg_1 <= {RND[31:0], Krg_1[1023:32]}; 
    RND<= {RND[31:0],RND[1023:32]}; 
    end 
       else if (EnKey == 1'b1) begin 
         Seq <= {Seq[2046:0],1'b0}; 
     if (MemSel[1]==0'b0) 
               Krg <= {Krg[1022:0], Krg[1023]}; 
     else  
     Krg_1 <= {Krg_1[1022:0], Krg_1[1023]}; 
     end 
   end 
  
   assign Dout = r_data_m; 
   assign  seq_bit = Seq[2047]; 
 function  mux2_1_1; 
      input  a, b; 
      input Sel; 
      case (Sel) 
        1'b0: mux2_1_1 = a; 
        1'b1: mux2_1_1 = b; 
      endcase 
   endfunction // mux2_1_1 
  
   function [31:0] mux2_1_32; 
      input [31:0] a, b; 
      input Sel; 
      case (Sel) 
        1'b0: mux2_1_32 = a; 
        1'b1: mux2_1_32 = b; 
      endcase 
   endfunction // mux2_1_32 
 
   function [8:0] mux3_1_9; 
      input [8:0] a, b, c, d; 
      input [2:0] Sel; 
      case (Sel) 
        3'b000: mux3_1_9 = a; 
        3'b100: mux3_1_9 = b; 
 3'b010: mux3_1_9 = c; 
 3'b110: mux3_1_9 = c; 
 3'b001: mux3_1_9 = d; 
 3'b101: mux3_1_9 = d; 
        default: mux3_1_9 = a; 
      endcase 
   endfunction // mux3_1_9 
 74 
 
   function [8:0] mux6_1_9; 
      input [8:0] a, b, c, d,e; 
      input [4:0] Sel; 
      case (Sel) 
         5'b00000: mux6_1_9 = a; 
         5'b00100: mux6_1_9 = b; 
      5'b00010: mux6_1_9 = c; 
    5'b00110: mux6_1_9 = c; 
    5'b00001: mux6_1_9 = d; 
      5'b00101: mux6_1_9 = d; 
    5'b01000: mux6_1_9 = 9'b000000000; 
         5'b01100: mux6_1_9 = 9'b000000000; 
      5'b01010: mux6_1_9 = c; 
    5'b01110: mux6_1_9 = c; 
    5'b01001: mux6_1_9 = d; 
      5'b01101: mux6_1_9 = d; 
    5'b10000: mux6_1_9 = e; 
         5'b10100: mux6_1_9 = e; 
      5'b10010: mux6_1_9 = e; 
    5'b10110: mux6_1_9 = e; 
    5'b10001: mux6_1_9 = e; 
      5'b10101: mux6_1_9 = e; 
    5'b11000: mux6_1_9 = e; 
         5'b11100: mux6_1_9 = e; 
      5'b11010: mux6_1_9 = e; 
    5'b11110: mux6_1_9 = e; 
    5'b11001: mux6_1_9 = e; 
      5'b11101: mux6_1_9 = e; 
    default: mux6_1_9 = a; 
      endcase 
   endfunction // mux6_1_9 
  
   function [31:0] mux3_1_32; 
      input [31:0] a, b, c; 
      input [1:0] Sel; 
      case (Sel) 
        2'b00: mux3_1_32 = a; 
        2'b01: mux3_1_32 = b; 
        2'b10: mux3_1_32 = c; 
        default: mux3_1_32 = a; 
      endcase 
   endfunction // mux3_1_32 
 
   function [31:0] mux4_1_32; 
      input [31:0] a, b,c,d,e; 
      input [2:0]Sel; 
      case (Sel) 
        3'b000: mux4_1_32 = a; 
        3'b001: mux4_1_32 = b; 
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    3'b010: mux4_1_32 = c; 
    3'b011: mux4_1_32 = d; 
    3'b100: mux4_1_32 = e; 
        3'b101: mux4_1_32 = e; 
    3'b110: mux4_1_32 = e; 
    3'b111: mux4_1_32 = e; 
      default: mux4_1_32 = a; 
  endcase 
   endfunction // mux4_1_32 
   assign d_in = (state == MOD_GET) ? Min : Din; 
   assign w_data = mux3_1_32(d_out, r_data_s, d_in, DSel); 
   assign v = r_data_s[0]; 
    
   RSA_MultiplicationBlock  MULT_BLK  (CLK, RSTn, MBCon, r_data_m, r_data_s, d_out, sign); 
 
   RSA_SequencerBlock       SEQ_BLK     
     (CLK, RSTn, EN, Krdy, Mrdy, Drdy, key_bit,seq_bit, sign, v, MBCon, MemCon_m, MemCon_s, 
EnKey, MemSel,FM, DSel, count, InOutMem, state, BSY, Kvld, Mvld, Dvld); 
 
   assign MemCon_i = (state == MOD_GET) ? {2'b11, 2'b10, count}:{2'b11, 2'b01, count}; 
   assign MemCon_o = {2'b01, 2'b00, count}; 
 
   assign MemCon0 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_m, MemCon_s, MemCon_i, MemCon_o, 9'b000000000, 
{FM,seq_bit,MemSel[0],InOutMem}); 
 
   assign MemCon1 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_s, MemCon_m, MemCon_i, MemCon_o, 
MemCon_s,{FM,seq_bit,MemSel[0],InOutMem});  
 
   assign MemCon2 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_m, MemCon_s, MemCon_i, MemCon_o, 
MemCon_m,{FM,~MemSel[1],MemSel[0], InOutMem}); 
 
   assign MemCon3 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_s, MemCon_m, MemCon_i, MemCon_o, 
9'b000000000,{FM,~MemSel[1],MemSel[0], InOutMem}); 
   
   assign r_data_m = mux4_1_32(r_data0, r_data1,r_data2,r_data3,r_data2, {FM,MemSel}); 
 
   assign r_data_s = mux4_1_32(r_data1, r_data0,r_data3,r_data2,r_data1,{FM,MemSel}); 
 
assign key_bit =  mux2_1_1 (Krg[1023],Krg_1[1023],MemSel[1]); 
    
   // memory simulation model 
   RSA_Memory MEM0 (r_data0, CLK, ~MemCon0[7], ~MemCon0[8], MemCon0[6:0], w_data); 
   RSA_Memory MEM1 (r_data1, CLK, ~MemCon1[7], ~MemCon1[8], MemCon1[6:0], w_data); 
   RSA_Memory MEM2 (r_data2, CLK, ~MemCon2[7], ~MemCon2[8], MemCon2[6:0], w_data); 
   RSA_Memory MEM3 (r_data3, CLK, ~MemCon3[7], ~MemCon3[8], MemCon3[6:0], w_data); 
endmodule // top 
 
/* RSA_ModExpSequencer is a sequencer module for moduler exponentiation X^E mod N. It is a 
component of RSA_SequenceBlock. It’s the structure for realizing modular exponentiation algorithm. 
*/ 
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module RSA_ModExpSequencer (CLK, RSTn, Rst, Msb, Exp, Cy_mr, Fin, pc); 
   input         CLK, RSTn, Rst; 
   input   Msb, Exp; 
 //input     PreComp; 
   input         Cy_mr; 
   input   Fin;   
   output [14:0] pc; 
    
   reg    [14:0] pc; 
   reg     IDLE; 
   always @(posedge CLK) begin 
     if (RSTn == 1'b0) begin 
       pc <= 15'b000000000000001; 
   IDLE<= 1'b0; 
     end 
   else if (Rst == 1'b1) begin 
       pc <= 15'b000000000000001; 
   IDLE<= 1'b0; 
     end 
   else if (pc[0]) 
       if (Fin == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0};      //  0 to 1 
       else       pc <= pc;                      //  0 to 0 
     else if (pc[1] || pc[2] || pc[3] || pc[9] )   
       if (Fin == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0};      //  1 to 2 
       else          pc <= pc;                   //  1 to 1 
     else if (pc[4]) 
     if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b0000000000100000;      //  1 to 2 
       else          pc <= pc;    
   else  if (IDLE) 
       if (Exp == 0) begin 
   pc <= 15'b001000000000000;   //  5 to 12    
   IDLE<=1'b0; 
   end 
   else         begin 
   pc <= 15'b000000001000000;    //  5 to 6    
   IDLE<=1'b0; 
   end 
   else if (pc[5]) 
   if (Msb == 1) begin 
   pc <= 15'b000000000000000; 
   IDLE<=1'b1;  
   end 
   else          pc <= 15'b000000010000000;     //  5 to 7              
   else if (pc[6])  
   if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b000100000000000;     //  6 to 11 
       else          pc <= pc;                   //  6 to 6 
   else if (pc[7])  pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0};       //  7 to 8                       
     else if (pc[8]) 
       if (Cy_mr == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0};    //  8 to 9 
       else            pc <= 15'b000000000100000;   //  8 to 5 
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     else if (pc[11]) 
     if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b000000100000000;     //  11 to 8 
       else          pc <= pc;                      // 11 to 11 
   else if (pc[12])  
   if (Fin == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0};     //  12 to 13 
       else          pc <= pc;                      // 12 to 12 
   else if (pc[13]) 
     if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b000000100000000;    //  13 to 8 
       else          pc <= pc;                      // 13 to 13 
   else  if(pc[10]) 
   if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b100000000000000; 
     else          pc <= pc; 
   //  to next state 
   end 
    
endmodule // ModExpSequencer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/* This module is a sequencer module for montgomery multiplication X * Y * R^(-1) mod N. It 
generates the control signal to fulfill specific operation commanded by ModExpSequencer. The 
control signal is a 31 bits data which are used for coordinate memory module, loop control module 
and Multiplication Block*/  
module RSA_MontMultSequencer (CLK, RSTn, Start, i, Cy_m, Sel, exp,Con, Hlt,Con_Yj); 
   input         CLK, RSTn, Start; 
   input  [9:0]  i;         
   input   Cy_m, Sel,exp;      
   output [30:0] Con; 
   output   Hlt, Con_Yj; 
 
   reg    [27:0] pc; 
 
   wire   zero; 
 
   assign zero = ~(|(i ^ 10'b0000000000)); 
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   always @(posedge CLK) begin 
     if (RSTn == 1'b0) 
       pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000000000; 
     else if(Start == 1'b1) 
       pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000000001; 
     else if (pc[1]) 
       pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000001000;      //  1 to 3 
     else if (pc[5]) 
       if (zero == 1'b1) 
  pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};                     //  5 to 6 
       else  
  pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000100000000;    //  5 to 8   
     else if (pc[7]) 
       if (Cy_m == 1'b1) 
  pc <= 28'b0000000000000001000000000000;    //  7 to 12 
       else 
  pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000001000000;    //  7 to 6 
     else if (pc[9]) 
       pc <= 28'b0000000000000000100000000000; 
     else if (pc[11]) 
       if (Cy_m == 1'b1) 
  pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};                     //  11 to 12 
       else 
  pc <= 28'b0000000000000000010000000000;    //  11 to 10 
     else if (pc[17]) 
       if (Cy_m == 1'b1) 
  pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};                     //  17 to 18 
       else 
  pc <= 28'b0000000000010000000000000000;    //  17 to 16 
     else if (pc[21]) 
       if (Cy_m == 1'b1) 
  pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};                     //  21 to 22 
       else 
  pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000000100;    //  21 to 2 
     else if (pc[23]) 
       pc <= 28'b0010000000000000000000000000;      //  23 to 25 
     else if (pc[25]) 
       if (Cy_m == 1'b1) 
  pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};                     //  25 to 26 
       else 
  pc <= 28'b0000010000000000000000000000;    //  25 to 22 
     else 
       pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0}; 
   end 
 
   // Sel = 1 squaring      Sel = 0 multiplication 
 
function [30:0] decoder; 
     input [27:0] pc; 
     input Sel, zero, exp; 
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     case({exp ,Sel,pc}) 
   
 //   Pc[13]  Y=Z *Y mod N, exp=0,sel=0///// 
 30'b000000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b010100, 6'b001000}; // 0 m                                   
 30'b000000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b000101}; // 1 
 30'b000000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b000001}; // 2   
 30'b000000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder = 
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3 
                                   else              decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 
6'b011000}; // 3 
 30'b000000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4 
 30'b000000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000100, 6'b001100}; // 5 m                                   
 30'b000000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6 
 30'b000000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 7 m s   
 30'b000000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b001001}; // 8 m    
 30'b000000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9 
 30'b000000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10 
 30'b000000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 11   
 30'b000000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12 
 30'b000000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010001}; // 13  
 30'b000000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14 
 30'b000000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15 
 30'b000000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16 
 30'b000000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17 
 30'b000000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18 
 30'b000000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19 
 30'b000000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b001111}; // 20 m 
   30'b000000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011, 6'b100101, 
6'b000101}; // 21 
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 30'b000000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22 
 30'b000000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23 
 30'b000001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24 
 30'b000010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001, 
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25  *** 
 30'b000100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26 
 30'b000100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27 
  
  
 //////Pc[12]/// Z=Z*Z mod N,exp=0,sel=1 
 
 30'b010000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b010100, 6'b100000}; // 0 s 
 30'b010000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b000101}; // 1 
 30'b010000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 2 
 30'b010000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder = 
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3 
                                   else              decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 
6'b011000}; // 3 
 30'b010000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4 
 30'b010000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000100, 6'b100100}; // 5 s 
 30'b010000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6 
 30'b010000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 7 m s 
 30'b010000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b100000}; // 8 s 
 30'b010000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9 
 30'b010000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10 
 30'b010000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 11 
 30'b010000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12 
 30'b010000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 13 
 30'b010000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14 
 30'b010000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15 
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 30'b010000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16 
 30'b010000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17 
 30'b010000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18 
 30'b010000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19 
 30'b010000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b100111}; // 20 s 
 30'b010000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011, 
6'b100101, 6'b000101}; // 21 
 30'b010000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22 
 30'b010000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23 
 30'b010001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24 
 30'b010010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001, 
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25 
 30'b010100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26 
 30'b010100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27 
 
   //   Pc[11]  Z= Z*Y modN ,exp=1, sel=0///// 
 30'b100000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b010100, 6'b001000}; // 0 m 
 30'b100000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b000101}; // 1 
 30'b100000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 2   
 30'b100000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder = 
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3 
                                   else              decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 
6'b011000}; // 3 
 30'b100000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4 
 30'b100000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000100, 6'b001100}; // 5 m 
 30'b100000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6 
 30'b100000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 7 m s   
 30'b100000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b001000}; // 8 m     
 30'b100000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9 
 30'b100000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10 
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 30'b100000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 11    
 30'b100000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12 
 30'b100000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 13    
 30'b100000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14 
 30'b100000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15 
 30'b100000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16 
 30'b100000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17 
 30'b100000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18 
 30'b100000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19 
 30'b100000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b001111}; // 20 m 
 30'b100000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011, 
6'b100101, 6'b000101}; // 21 
 30'b100000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22 
 30'b100000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23 
 30'b100001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24 
 30'b100010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001, 
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25 
 30'b100100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26 
 30'b100100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27 
 
  //  Pc[6]  , Y=Y*Y modN, exp=1, sel=1 
 30'b110000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b010100, 6'b001000}; // 0 m                                   
 30'b110000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b001101}; // 1   
 30'b110000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b000001}; // 2   
 30'b110000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder = 
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3 
                                   else              decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 
6'b011000}; // 3 
 30'b110000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4    
 30'b110000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000100, 6'b001100}; // 5 m                                   
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 30'b110000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6 
 30'b110000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 7 m s   
 30'b110000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b001001}; // 8 m    
 30'b110000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9 
 30'b110000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10 
 30'b110000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 11   
 30'b110000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12 
 30'b110000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010001}; // 13  
 30'b110000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14 
 30'b110000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15 
 30'b110000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16 
 30'b110000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17 
 30'b110000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18 
 30'b110000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19 
 30'b110000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111, 
6'b000000, 6'b001111}; // 20 m 
   30'b110000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011, 6'b100101, 
6'b000101}; // 21 
 30'b110000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101, 
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22 
 30'b110000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23 
 30'b110001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100, 
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24 
 30'b110010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001, 
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25   
 30'b110100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001, 
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26 
 30'b110100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000, 
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27 
  
 default: decoder = 31'b0000000000000000000000000000000; 
      endcase 
   endfunction 
 
   assign Con = decoder(pc, Sel, zero,exp ); 
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   assign Hlt = pc[27]; 
assign Con_Yj = exp ^~ Sel; 
 
endmodule // MontMult_Sequencer 
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